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Abstract: We report the results of a simulation investigating in which cir-
cumstances communicative conventions emerge and can be maintained within a
population of agents under different selective pressures. We will give a game the-
oretical analysis of few relevant cases. We will then report our empirical results
of the error threshold phenomenon analytically proved in Nowak et al. [2].
Introduction
Communication systems can be characterized as a mapping from a set of mean-
ings to a set of signals. We attempt in this paper to set a general framework
to describe under which circumstances an optimal convention (or Saussurean
Communication) can be established within a population of individuals.
The model
We will consider a scenario of 400 communicative individuals in an unbounded,
torus shaped space. This scenario is similar to the one described in Oliphant
1994 [3].
The population of agents shares a finite set of signals used to convey a corre-
sponding amount of shared meanings. Each individual is born with a trans-
mitting system specifying which signal is associated with each meaning and a
receiving system mapping back each symbol to a specific meaning. We will take
into consideration the very general case in which the receiving system doesn’t
necessary mirror the transmitting system.
Each agent has 8 neighbours and goes through 5 life stages; after the fifth the
first follows. In each stage the agents try to establish 8 random communica-
tions with their neighbours. In every communication two agents act alternately
as speakers and listeners. The speaker picks one random meaning out of the
meaning space and sends the associated signal to the hearer (according to its
transmitting system). The hearer uses its receiving system to find the meaning
associated with the received signal. If this meaning is the same as originally
chosen, the communication is said to be successful.
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During the fist stage, an individual selects a teacher from the set of its neigh-
bours according to the communication success (fitness) they have accumulated
during the previous life stage (a neighbour with double fitness has double proba-
bility to be selected). The newborn agent then acquires with a certain precision
the communication system of its teacher: each mapping in the teacher’s com-
munication system is learned with probability 1− µ and it is randomly chosen
with probability µ (mutation rate).
The simulation
In order to start with the simulations we need to take into consideration several
parameters. Each set of parameters corresponds to a specific communication
scheme. The aim of this study is therefore to understand for which communica-
tion schemes a Saussurean Communication can emerge and can be maintained
within the population. We can describe the parameters as follows:
N: number of meanings used by the agents, equivalent to the number of forms
(symbols) they are able to express.
µ: the mutation rate characterizing the acquisition phase.
Initialization : whether in the starting point of the simulation each agent is
initialized with a random communication system (random start) or with
a unique optimal communication system (optimal start).
Payoff Matrix: when communicating to its neighbours, each agent cumulates
a transmission and reception success rate. The payoff matrix specifies
how the fitness function is calculated in respect to these two values. Two
general cases are taken into consideration: the case where the fitness is
the average of the two values (both speakers and listeners are rewarded),
and the case where the fitness coincides with the reception success rate
(only listeners rewarded).
Spatial organization: whether the agents keep the same position during the
life cycle (spatially organized) or are randomly displaced at each iteration
(non spatially organized).
Iterative: this is an optional mode; when active each agent has two possible
communication systems: in each communication attempt each agents uses
the first communication system if the previous reception was successful,




We will run here the 4 simulations reported in Oliphant. In all the cases we
have N = 2 and a random initialization startup: each agent is initialized with a
random communication system and a random age (life stage).
Simulation 1
In the very first case we consider the default setting: only listeners are rewarded
in a non-spatially organized population. Under these parameters Saussurean
Communication can emerge but is not stable. Figure 1 shows a snapshot of a
simulation where µ = 0.02.
Figure 1: snapshot simulation 1
The left side panel represents the population of agents. The color of each square
characterizes the communication system of the associated agent. The bottom
left number is the age and the top right number is the fitness rounded and mul-
tiplied by 10 (X stands for 10). The right side panel represents the frequency of
each colored communication system for each iteration. The black line specifies
the level of the average fitness of the entire population.
We notice how the blue optimal communication system (10/10) emerges around
iteration 300 but it is suddenly replaced by the red population (00/10) which
has the same payoff of the blue agents since it has the same receiving system
(only listeners are rewarded).
That no communication system is stable with these parameters is clear from
Table 1: taken any communication system X, there is always a different com-
munication system Y such that F (X, X) ≤ F (Y, X) and if it is equal F (X, Y ) ≯
F (Y, Y ), where F is the payoff function. Hence, there exists no “evolutionary
stable strategy” [1]. In particular, in a population where any of the two optimal
communication systems (01/01 or 10/10) is dominating, three other suboptimal
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communication systems have the chance to invade: they perform equally good
when communicating with the dominants and no worse (equal) when commu-
nicating among themselves.
F
00 00 00 00 01 01 01 01 10 10 10 10 11 11 11 11
00 01 10 11 00 01 10 11 00 01 10 11 00 01 10 11
00/00 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5
00/01 .5 .5 .5 .5 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 .5 .5 .5 .5
00/10 .5 .5 .5 .5 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 .5 .5 .5 .5
00/11 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5
01/00 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5
01/01 .5 .5 .5 .5 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 .5 .5 .5 .5
01/10 .5 .5 .5 .5 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 .5 .5 .5 .5
01/11 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5
10/00 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5
10/01 .5 .5 .5 .5 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 .5 .5 .5 .5
10/10 .5 .5 .5 .5 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 .5 .5 .5 .5
10/11 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5
11/00 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5
11/01 .5 .5 .5 .5 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 .5 .5 .5 .5
11/10 .5 .5 .5 .5 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 .5 .5 .5 .5
11/11 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5 .5
Table 1: payoff values between the 16 CS relative to simulation 1
Simulation 2
In the second simulation we will still consider a non-spatially organized popu-
lation. The only difference in respect to the previous simulation is that now we
reward both the speakers and the listeners. Figure 2 shows a snapshot of the
new simulation keeping µ = 0.02. We notice that the red optimal communica-
tion system 10/10 emerges almost immediately and it is able to maintain the
domain of the entire population.
Figure 3 shows how the percentage of the dominant communication system
(after 1000 iterations) changes with the change of µ. The graph reports the av-
erage percentage and fitness out of 10 runs of the simulation. When µ = 0 there
is some run where no full dominance is obtained (see Special Case 1). From
the plot it is clear that the percentage of the dominant communication system
decreases linearly with the increase of the mutation rate: for 0 < µ . 0.10
an optimal communication system can invade and keep domain of the entire
population (staying above chance frequency). With higher mutation rate no
communication system can dominate the population and the fitness stays at
chance level.
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Figure 2: snapshot simulation 2
Figure 3: graph simulation 2
Simulation 3
In the third case we will start again from the default settings of Simulation 1
(only listeners are rewarded) with an iterative communication mode. We want
to see if the capability of keeping a primary communication system in “trusted
neighborhoods” can in itself allow the emergence of a Saussurean Communica-
tion within the population.
The snapshot of Figure 4 reports one possible simulation run. In the iterative
mode each agent in the left side panel is split in two parts: the bottom left one
is colored with the primary communication system and the upper right with the
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secondary one.
The optimal red communication system 10/10 is able to invade after around 200
iterations and keeps the domain of the entire population until the last iteration.
It is important to note from the snapshot that, once the Saussurean Commu-
nication takes place, the majority of the secondary transmission systems differs
from the red primary transmission system. If for some chance it would drift
to the primary transmission system, any non trusted opponent would benefit
from it. This possibility mentioned in Oliphant’s paper as a major source of
instability seems to affect very few simulations and mainly in cases where the
mutation rate is kept very low (µ . 0.005).
Figure 4: snapshot simulation 3
The graph in Figure 5 shows the percentage of the dominant communication sys-
tem with increasing µ. Here there is a relatively sudden jump around µ = 0.05.
After this threshold the dominant communication system stays at chance fre-
quency. It is also possible to see a rise in fitness from 0 < µ < 0.01 This confirms
our previous result that for very low mutation rates, a random drift leading to
the optimality of the secondary transmission system, can compromise the main-
tenance of a Saussurean Communication.
The results seem to prove that the iterative communication mode can be a
sufficient element to allow the emerge and maintenance of an optimal commu-
nication system for 0.01 < µ < 0.05. The analogue iterated mode simulation
reported by Oliphant, characterized by an instability of the Saussurean Com-
munication, considers the case in which the mutation rate falls in the critical
region (∼ 0.0041).
In the actual implementation of the iterative mode, if the speaker fails/succeeds
to convey a certain meaning, only the listener stops/starts to trust the oppo-
1The mutation system introduced in Oliphant is based on mutation affecting the entire
genome (.27%) and crossing-over. The existence of a precise way to convert it into our metric
is in doubt.
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Figure 5: graph simulation 3
nent2. We believe that this is how Oliphant’s simulation works. We observe a
remarkable difference in the outcome if both the listener and the speaker are
affected by the failure or success of the last communication attempt. In this
new circumstance the secondary communication system is more susceptible to
random drift allowing a cyclic shift between the two optimal communication
systems as shown in Figure 6. Figure 7 plots the percentage of the dominant
population of this special case. If compared with the dynamics in Figure 5 we
can consider some qualitative differences: in the new setting the initial rising in
fitness is slightly shifted to the right and the dominant population percentage
reaches chance level much more sharply.
Simulation 4
So far we have been dealing with non spatially organized population: the po-
sition of each has been randomly shuffled at each iteration. This perfectly
represents the case in which no spatial organization is taken into account.
In the last simulation we want to see how the outcome of the simulation 1 is
affected when the positions of the agents are preserved through their life cycles.
This basically means that each agent keeps the same exact neighbours through-
out its 5 life stages.
Figure 8 shows how spatial organization is sufficient for Saussurean Commu-
2This is particular true for this setting where the listener is the only one affected by the
success or failure of the communication.
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Figure 6: snapshot simulation 3 with modified iterative mode
Figure 7: graph simulation 3 with modified iterative mode
nication to emerge. It is evident how “small communities” sharing a subopti-
mal communication systems are able to survive above chance frequency. This
“parish effect” phenomenon applies only to communication systems compatible
with the dominant one. In the snapshot the green, blue, and violet populations
are example of surviving parishes which are able to understand the dominant
red community, without having high payoff when communicating among them-
selves.
As in all the previous simulations Figure 9 plots the changing of the percentage
of the dominant communication system with the changing of the mutation rate
µ. The dominant population decreases sharply when the mutation rate is close
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Figure 8: snapshot simulation 4
to zero and slowly reaches change frequency around µ = 0.2 with a character-
istic hyperbolic shape. This seems to suggest that under these parameters the
percentage of the dominant communication system is inversely proportional to
the mutation rate.
Figure 9: graph simulation 4
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Case studies
In this section we will take into consideration 3 case studies which will be an-
alyzed in detail within a game theoretical framework. As before we will keep
N = 2.
Case Study 1 - Two symmetric communication systems
We will consider here the case where both speakers and listeners are rewarded
in a non spatially organized population (simulation 2) with µ = 0.
The most probable outcome of this setting is the absolute dominance of an op-
timal communication system. A rather rare exception is reported in Figure 10.
This simulation can be divided in two main phases. During the first part (until
iteration 964) 3 main communication systems are present in the population:
red (11/01), green (01/11) and blue (01/00). The red communication system
is characterized by an optimal transmitting system and a suboptimal receiving
system while the green and the blue have a suboptimal transmitting system and
an optimal receiving system. It’s important to notice that the green and the
blue have the same payoff when communicating with the same opponent. For
this reason we can conclude that the population is in a equilibrium state: half
is red and the other half is green and blue. During the second phase the blue
population is completely replaced by the green population. Since no selective
pressure has caused this outcome we say that the blue population goes extinct
by random drift.
Table 2 reports the specification of the 3 communication systems, the payoff
function and the derived population dynamics equation. Figure 11 shows the
3D geometric interpretation of this equation: the plane represts the equation
xR + xG + xB = 1 which is the space of all possible frequency combinations of
the 3 communication systems. While there is no horizontal selective pressure
(between green and blue) we have a vertical point of attraction in xR = 1/2.
This bias of attraction is also evident in the 2D illustration which is a vertical
section of the plane.
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F R G B
R 1/2 3/4 3/4
G 3/4 1/2 1/2
B 3/4 1/2 1/2
















Table 2: case study 1 a) red, green and blue transmitting and receiving systems
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fR = fG = fB














- - -   
Figure 11: graphical representation of population dynamics of case study 1
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Case Study 2 - Two asymmetric communication systems
In the second case study we will consider an other exceptional case of Simu-
lation 2 with µ = 0. In this outcome (Figure 12) the red population has an
optimal transmitting system and suboptimal receiving system while the green
has an optimal speaking an an optimal reception system in respect to the red,
and opposite in respect to itself. The green population will therefore have a
zero payoff when its members communicate among themselves. This lead to a
stable situation where this population is 1/4 of the entire population. Table 3
reports the details of two communication systems and the population dynamics.
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Table 3: case study 2 a) red, green transmitting and receiving systems b) payoff
function c) population dynamics equation d) graphical representation of popu-
lation dynamics
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Case Study 3 - Two symmetric communication systems
with only listeners rewarded
In the last case study we consider the case where only listeners are rewarded in
a non spatially organized population (simulation 1) with µ = 0. In this case we
have an equilibrium between the red and the green population each occupying
half of the space. The red population has a high payoff when communicating
with the green but zero payoff against itself. Table 4 reports the specification
of the population dynamics.


















G 1/2 1/2 fR = xR · FR(R,R) + xG · FR(R,G) = xG
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Table 4: case study 3 a) red, green transmitting and receiving systems b) payoff
function c) population dynamics equation d) graphical representation of popu-
lation dynamics
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Analytic analysis of communication systems
Introduction
This section will present a mathematical framework for the analysis of the evo-
lution and maintenance of communication conventions, according to the math-
ematical model used in Nowak et al. [2]. We will compare this analysis with the
empirical results we can obtain from our simulation. We will limit our study
to the case where both speakers and listeners are rewarded in a non spatially
distributed population (as in Simulation 2).
The two models
In order to compare the two models we will need to define our set of variables:
N is the size of the meanings space (as before).
G is the number of communication systems or grammars.
dij is the number of mappings differing between grammar i and j.
eij is the number of mappings in common between grammar i and j.
A is the compatibility matrix specifying to which degree grammar i is com-
patible with grammar j.
F is the payoff matrix specifying the payoff between any two grammars i, j.
xi is the frequency of individuals using grammar i.
fi is the average payoff of a individuals using grammar i.
Q is the acquisition matrix specifying for each i, j what is the probabil-
ity that an agent learning from a teacher with grammar i will end up
speaking grammar j.
φ is the average fitness of the population.
ẋ i is the population dynamic of grammar i: it represents how much the
frequency of grammar i changed from last iteration (in a continuous
timeline it is the derivate of frequency with respect to time).
The main difference between the two models lies on the complexity behind the
grammars of the agents. In Nowak’s model the grammars are assumed to be
equally distant from one another while in Oliphant’s the hierarchical structure
behind the communication system leads to a more complex distance space of
the type found in Table 1. This difference causes the mutation rate to have
different scopes in the two models: in Nowak’s µ is related to the probability
of going from one grammar to any other grammar, while in Oliphant’s µ refers
to the probability of changing each single unit of the grammar. In Table 5 we
report how the formulas behind the two models are related.
Results
Oliphant’s model results in a more complex population dynamics formula which
is hard to derive analytically. We therefore choose to approximate the result
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Table 5: Math behind the population dynamics of Nowak and Oliphant
Optimal Start the entire population shares the same optimal grammar while in
a Random Start all the grammars have equal initial frequency.
In each iteration the new frequency of each grammar is calculated according to
the population dynamic formula of Table 5. A population is consider to have
reached a linguistic equilibrium when the new iteration is equal to the previous
one (up to a tolerance of 10−5).
We start by showing the result of the numerical approximation of Nowak’s
model. In Figure 14 we can see that the approximation leads to the Error
Threshold Effect found Nowak: in a population initialized with an “Optimal
Start”, there exist a specific value3 of acquisition error (µ) above which the
optimal communication is not able to be maintained in the population.
If we now turn the attention to our simulation we would like to find out whether
we can reproduce any similar phenomenon. In Figure 3 we saw already how the
dominant communication system changes with the increase of µ in a “Random
start” mode, and we couldn’t find any threshold behaviour there. Figure 15
shows the same dynamics together with the “Optimal Start” counterpart. This
doesn’t seem to add any advantage: the dominant communication system lin-
early drops with the increase of µ from the very first beginning whether the
initialization is optimal or random. In Figure 16 we present the same result we
can derive numerically from the formula of Oliphant section of Table 5.
In the simulations we run so far, apart from the ”iterative mode”, we have
encountered a unique communication scheme: one single meaning is picked at
random in each communication between two agents. We now introduce a new
constraint in the communication system, the All or Nothing (AoN) mode,
where all the meanings are used in the communication between two agents. Fur-
thermore the payoff of the communication is 1 if and only if all the meanings
are correctly communicated (0 otherwise).
3We notice that this specific value seems to be somehow shifted compared to the one
reported in Nowak. In our case the threshold occurs on µ = 0.16 while in Nowak µ = 0.07.
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Figure 14: Numeric approximation of Nowak population dynamics with aij=0.5
and G = 10
Figure 15: Simulation in standard mode with N=2 (G=16)
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Figure 16: Numeric approximation of Oliphant population dynamics in “Nor-
mal” mode with N=2 (G=16)
We want to test whether AoN can bring us closer to the threshold effect. Fig-
ure 17 shows the dominant communication system dynamics from our simulation
in the new mode with N=2. The frequency is now decreasing in a qualitative
different way than before but still far away from replicating the threshold dy-
namics. Figure 18 shows a similar dynamics for N=10.
We try to replicate such dynamic using numeric approximation. We first modify
the formula behind the payoff Fij between any two grammars i and j (Table 5).
While before it was defined as the average of their reciprocal compatibilities,
we now use the floor value of the average (Fij is rounded to 0 whenever the
average of the reciprocal compatibilities is less than 1). Figure 19 shows the
new dynamic with N = 2. Although the curve looks pretty similar to the one
we encountered before in Figure 17, it doesn’t seem to have the expected hy-
perbolic shape. If we now analyze the F matrix, we realize that the constraint
we imposed, selects 4 communication system pairs to have positive (and maxi-
mum) fitness. Besides the trivial case of the 2 optimal grammars (10/10, 01/01)
each having positive fitness when communicating with itself, we have 2 other
complementar grammars (01/10, 10/01) wich score positive fitness when com-
municating with one another. In order to exclude the latter pair, we have to
put a new constraint, restricting a pair of grammars to have maximum payoff
only when each separately has maximum fitness against itself. Figure 20 shows
the expected dynamic with this last modification.4
4Unfortunately our numeric approximation cannot verify our simulation result in the case
where N=10. In order to do so we would have to deal with 1020 possible grammars.
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Figure 17: Simulation in “All or Nothing” mode with N=2 (G=16)
Figure 18: Simulation in “All or Nothing” mode with N=10 (G=1020)
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Figure 19: Numeric approximation of Oliphant population dynamics in “All or
Nothing” mode (first version) with N=2 (G=16)
Figure 20: Numeric approximation of Oliphant population dynamics in “All or
Nothing” mode (second version) with N=2 (G=16)
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We would like to conclude this section with a further constraint which we can
apply to our simulation, in order to replicate the threshold effect: the Ab-
solute All or Nothing mode (AAoN). In this new setting all the meanings
are used in the communication between two agents as in AoN. The payoff of
an agent is 1 if and only if all the meanings are correctly communicated in
all the communications (0 otherwise). Figure 21 shows this result. So far, we
found no way to obtain the same result with numeric approximation.
Figure 21: Simulation in “Absolute All or Nothing” mode with N=2 (G=16)
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